On the connection between probability boxes and possibility measures by Troffaes, Matthias C. M. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
3.
55
94
v1
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
29
 M
ar 
20
11
Matthias C. M. Troffaes, Enrique Miranda, and Sebastien Destercke. On the connection between
probability boxes and possibility measures. Submitted, 2011.
ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PROBABILITY BOXES AND POSSIBILITY
MEASURES
MATTHIAS C. M. TROFFAES, ENRIQUE MIRANDA, AND SEBASTIEN DESTERCKE
ABSTRACT. We explore the relationship between possibility measures (supremum preserving normed mea-
sures) and p-boxes (pairs of cumulative distribution functions) on totally preordered spaces, extending earlier
work in this direction by De Cooman and Aeyels, among others. We start by demonstrating that only those
p-boxes who have 0–1-valued lower or upper cumulative distribution function can be possibility measures,
and we derive expressions for their natural extension in this case. Next, we establish necessary and sufficient
conditions for a p-box to be a possibility measure. Finally, we show that almost every possibility measure can
be modelled by a p-box. Whence, any techniques for p-boxes can be readily applied to possibility measures.
We demonstrate this by deriving joint possibility measures from marginals, under varying assumptions of
independence, using a technique known for p-boxes. Doing so, we arrive at a new rule of combination for
possibility measures, for the independent case.
1. INTRODUCTION
Firstly, possibility measures are supremum preserving set functions, and were introduced in fuzzy
set theory [39], although earlier appearances exist [28, 20]. Because of their computational simplicity,
possibility measures are widely applied in many fields, including data analysis [32], diagnosis [4], cased-
based reasoning [18], and psychology [27]. This paper concerns quantitative possibility theory [13],
where degrees of possibility range in the unit interval. Interpretations abound [11]: we can see them
as likelihood functions [12], as particular cases of plausibility measures [29, 30], as extreme probability
distributions [31], or as upper probabilities [37, 6]. The upper probability interpretation fits our purpose
best, whence is assumed herein.
Secondly, probability boxes [14, 15], or p-boxes for short, are pairs of lower and upper cumulative
distribution functions, and are often used in risk and safety studies, in which they play an essential role.
P-boxes have been connected to info-gap theory [16], random sets [19, 26], and also, partly, to possibility
measures [1, 6]. P-boxes can be defined on arbitrary finite spaces [9], and, more generally, even on
arbitrarily totally pre-ordered spaces [34]—we will use this extensively.
This paper aims to consolidate the connection between possibility measures and p-boxes, making as
few assumptions as possible. We prove that almost every possibility measure can be interpreted as a p-
box, whence, p-boxes effectively generalize possibility measures. Conversely, we provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for a p-box to be a possibility measure, whence, providing conditions under which
the more efficient mathematical machinery of possibility measures is applicable to p-boxes.
To study this connection, we use imprecise probabilities [36], because both possibility measures and p-
boxes are particular cases of imprecise probabilities. Possibility measures are explored as imprecise prob-
abilities in [37, 6, 23], and p-boxes were studied as imprecise probabilities briefly in [36, Section 4.6.6]
and [33], and in much more detail in [34].
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we give the basics of the behavioural theory of im-
precise probabilities, and recall some facts about p-boxes and possibility measures; in Section 3, we first
determine necessary and sufficient conditions for a p-box to be maximum preserving, before determining
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in Section 4 necessary and sufficient conditions for a p-box to be a possibility measure; in Section 5, we
show that almost any possibility measure can be seen as particular p-box, and that many p-boxes can be
seen as a couple of possibility measures; some special cases are detailed in Section 6. Finally, in Sec-
tion 7 we apply the work on multivariate p-boxes from [34] to derive multivariate possibility measures
from given marginals, and in Section 8 we give a number of additional comments and remarks.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Imprecise Probabilities. We start with a brief introduction to imprecise probabilities (see [2, 38,
36, 22] for more details). Because possibility measures are interpretable as upper probabilities, we start
out with those, instead of lower probabilities—the resulting theory is equivalent.
Let Ω be the possibility space. A subset of Ω is called an event. Denote the set of all events by ℘pΩq,
and the set of all finitely additive probabilities on ℘pΩq by P .
In this paper, an upper probability is any real-valued function P defined on an arbitrary subset K of
℘pΩq. With P, we associate a lower probability P on tA : Ac PK u via the conjugacy relationship
PpAq  1PpAcq.
Denote the set of all finitely additive probabilities on ℘pΩq that are dominated by P by:
M pPq  tP PP : pA PK qpPpAq ¤ PpAqqu
Clearly, M pPq is also the set of all finitely additive probabilities on ℘pΩq that dominate P on its domain
tA : Ac PK u.
The upper envelope E of M pPq is called the natural extension [36, Thm. 3.4.1] of P:
EpAq  suptPpAq : P PM pPqu
for all AΩ. The corresponding lower probability is denoted by E , so EpAq  1EpAcq. Clearly, E is
the lower envelope of M pPq.
We say that P is coherent (see [36, p. 134, Sec. 3.3.3]) when it coincides with E on its domain, that is,
when, for all A PK ,
PpAq  EpAq. (1)
The lower probability P is called coherent whenever P is.
The upper envelope of any set of finitely additive probabilities on ℘pΩq is coherent. A coherent
upper probability P and its conjugate lower probability P satisfy the following properties [36, Sec. 2.7.4],
whenever the relevant events belong to their domain:
(1) 0¤ PpAq ¤ PpAq ¤ 1.
(2) A B implies PpAq ¤ PpBq and PpAq ¤ PpBq. [Monotonicity]
(3) PpAYBq ¤ PpAq PpBq. [Subadditivity]
2.2. P-Boxes. In this section, we revise the theory and some of the main results for p-boxes defined on
totally preordered (not necessarily finite) spaces. For further details, we refer to [34].
We start with a totally preordered space pΩ,¨q. So, ¨ is transitive and reflexive and any two elements
are comparable. As usual, we write x   y for x ¨ y and x  y, x ¡ y for y   x, and x  y for x ¨ y and
y¨ x. For any two x, y PΩ exactly one of x  y, x y, or x¡ y holds. We also use the following common
notation for intervals in Ω:
rx,ys  tz PΩ : x¨ z¨ yu
px,yq  tz PΩ : x  z  yu
and similarly for rx,yq and px,ys.
We assume that Ω has a smallest element 0Ω and a largest element 1Ω. This is no essential assumption,
since we can always add these two elements to the space Ω.
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FIGURE 1. Example of a p-box on r0,1s.
A cumulative distribution function is a non-decreasing map F : ΩÑ r0,1s for which Fp1Ωq  1. For
each x PΩ, Fpxq is interpreted as the probability of r0Ω,xs. No further restrictions are imposed on F .
The quotient set of Ω with respect to  is denoted by Ω{ :
rxs

 ty PΩ : y xu for any x PΩ
Ω{   trxs

: x PΩu.
Because F is non-decreasing, F is constant on elements rxs

of Ω{ —we will use this repeatedly.
Definition 1. A probability box, or p-box, is a pair pF ,Fq of cumulative distribution functions from Ω to
r0,1s satisfying F ¤ F .
A p-box is interpreted as a lower and an upper cumulative distribution function (see Fig. 1), or more
specifically, as an upper probability PF ,F on the set of events
tr0Ω,xs : x PΩuYtpy,1Ωs : y PΩu
defined by
PF ,Fpr0Ω,xsq  Fpxq and PF,Fppy,1Ωsq  1Fpyq. (2)
We denote by EF ,F the natural extension of PF ,F to all events.
We now recall the main results that we shall need regarding the natural extension EF ,F of PF ,F (see
[34] for further details). First, because PF ,F is coherent, EF ,F coincides with PF ,F on its domain.
Next, to simplify the expression for natural extension, we introduce an element 0Ω such that:
0Ω  x for all x PΩ
Fp0Ωq  Fp0Ωq  Fp0Ωq  0.
Note that p0Ω,xs  r0Ω,xs. Now, let Ω ΩYt0Ωu, and define
H  tpx0,x1sY px2,x3sY   Y px2n,x2n 1s : x0   x1       x2n 1 in Ωu. (3)
Proposition 2 ([34]). For any A PH , that is A  px0,x1sY px2,x3sY    Y px2n,x2n 1s with x0   x1  
    x2n 1 in Ω, it holds that EF,FpAq  P
H
F,FpAq, where
PHF ,FpAq  1
n 1¸
k0
maxt0,Fpx2kqFpx2k1qu, (4)
with x
1  0Ω and x2n 2  1Ω.
To calculate EF,FpAq for an arbitrary event AΩ, we can use the outer measure [36, Cor. 3.1.9,p. 127]
PHF ,F

of the upper probability PHF,F defined in Eq. (4):
EF,FpAq  P
H
F,F

pAq  inf
CPH ,AC
PHF ,FpCq. (5)
4 M. TROFFAES, E. MIRANDA, AND S. DESTERCKE
For intervals, we immediately infer from Proposition 2 and Eq. (5) that
EF ,Fppx,ysq  FpyqFpxq (6a)
EF,Fprx,ysq  FpyqFpxq (6b)
EF ,Fppx,yqq 
#
FpyqFpxq if y has no immediate predecessor
FpyqFpxq if y has an immediate predecessor
(6c)
EF ,Fprx,yqq 
#
FpyqFpxq if y has no immediate predecessor
FpyqFpxq if y has an immediate predecessor
(6d)
for any x   y in Ω,1 where Fpyq denotes supz y Fpzq and similarly for Fpxq. If Ω{  is finite, then
one can think of z as the immediate predecessor of z in the quotient space Ω{  for any z PΩ. Note that
in particular
EF ,Fptxuq  FpxqFpxq (7)
for any x PΩ. We will use this repeatedly.
2.3. Possibility and Maxitive Measures. Very briefly, we introduce possibility and maxitive measures.
For further information, see [39, 13, 37, 6].
Definition 3. A maxitive measure is an upper probability P : ℘pΩq Ñ r0,1s satisfying PpAY Bq 
maxtPpAq,PpBqu for every A, BΩ.
It follows from the above definition that a maxitive measure is also maximum-preserving when we
consider finite unions of events.
The following result is well-known, but we include a quick proof for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 4. A maxitive measure P is coherent whenever PpHq  0 and PpΩq  1.
Proof. By [25, Theorem 1], a maxitive measure P satisfying PpHq  0 is 8-alternating, and as a conse-
quence also 2-alternating. Whence, P is coherent by [35, p. 55, Corollary 6.3]. 
Possibility measures are a particular case of maxitive measures.
Definition 5. A (normed) possibility distribution is a mapping pi : ΩÑ r0,1s satisfying supxPΩ pipxq  1.
A possibility distribution pi induces a possibility measure Π on ℘pΩq, given by:
ΠpAq  sup
xPA
pipxq for all AΩ.
Equivalently, possibility measures can be defined as supremum-preserving upper probabilities, i.e., as
functionals Π for which
ΠpYAPA Aq  sup
APA
ΠpAq A PpΩq.
If we write EΠ for the conjugate lower probability of the upper probability Π, then:
EΠpAq  1ΠpAcq  1 sup
xPAc
pipxq.
A possibility measure is maxitive, but not all maxitive measures are possibility measures.
As an imprecise probability model, possibility measures are not as expressive as for instance p-boxes—
for example, the only probability measures that can be represented by possibility measures are the degen-
erate ones. This poor expressive power is also illustrated by the fact that, for any event A:
ΠpAq   1 ùñ EΠpAq  0, and
EΠpAq ¡ 0 ùñ ΠpAq  1,
1In case x 0Ω, evidently, 0Ω is the immediate predecessor.
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FIGURE 2. A p-box for the proof of Proposition 6.
meaning that every event has a trivial probability bound on at least one side. Their main attraction is
that calculations with them are very easy: to find the upper (or lower) probability of any event, a simple
supremum suffices.
In the following sections, we characterize the circumstances under which a possibility measure Π is
the natural extension of some p-box pF ,Fq. In order to do so, we first characterise the conditions under
which a p-box induces a maxitive measure.
3. P-BOXES AS MAXITIVE MEASURES.
We show here that p-boxes pF ,Fq on any totally preordered space where at least one of F or F is
0–1-valued are maxitive measures, and in this sense are closely related to possibility measures. We then
derive a simple closed expression of the (upper) natural extension of such p-boxes.
3.1. A Necessary Condition for Maxitivity.
Proposition 6. If the natural extension EF ,F of a p-box pF ,Fq is maximum preserving, then at least one
of F or F is 0–1-valued.
Proof. We begin by showing that there is no x P Ω such that 0   Fpxq ¤ Fpxq   1. Assume ex absurdo
that there is such an x. For EF,F to be maximum preserving, we require that
EF ,Fpr0Ω,xsY px,1Ωsq maxtEF ,Fpr0Ω,xsq,EF,Fppx,1Ωsqu
But this cannot be. The left hand side is 1, whereas the right hand side is strictly less than one, because,
by Eq. (2),
EF,Fpr0Ω,xsq  Fpxq   1,
EF ,Fppx,1Ωsq  1Fpxq   1.
Whence, for every x P Ω, at least one of Fpxq  0 or Fpxq  1 must hold. In other words, Fpxq  0
whenever Fpxq   1, and Fpxq  1 whenever Fpxq ¡ 0 (see Figure 2). Hence, the sets
A1 : tx PΩ : Fpxq   1u
A2 : ty PΩ : Fpyq ¡ 0u
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are disjoint, and A1   A2 in the sense that x  y for all x P A1 and y P A2. Indeed, if x P A1 and y P A2, then
Fpxq   1, and Fpyq  1 because Fpyq ¡ 0. These can only hold simultaneously if x  y.
Note that A1 is empty when Fpxq  1 for all x P Ω, and in this case the desired result is trivially
established. A2 is non-empty because Fp1Ωq  1. Anyway, consider the sets
B1 : tx PΩ : 0  Fpxq   1u  A1
B2 : ty PΩ : 0  Fpyq   1u  A2
The proposition is established if we can show that at least one of these two sets is empty.
Suppose, ex absurdo, that both are non-empty. Pick any element c P B1 and d P B2 and consider the
set C  r0Ω,csY pd,1Ωs—note that c  d because c P A1 and d P A2, so pc,ds is non-empty. Whence, by
Eq. (4),
EF ,Fpr0Ω,csY pd,1Ωsq  1maxt0,FpdqFpcqu.
Also, by Eq. (2),
EF ,Fpr0Ω,csq  Fpcq,
EF ,Fppd,1Ωsq  1Fpdq.
So, for EF ,F to be maximum preserving, we require that
1maxt0,FpdqFpcqu maxtFpcq,1Fpdqu.
But this cannot hold. Indeed, because 0   Fpcq   1 and 0   1Fpdq   1, the above equality can only
hold if FpdqFpcq ¡ 0—otherwise the left hand side would be 1 whereas the right hand side is strictly
less than 1. So, effectively, we require that
1Fpdq Fpcq maxtFpcq,1Fpdqu.
This cannot hold, because the sum of two strictly positive numbers (in this case 1Fpdq and Fpcq) is
always strictly larger than their maximum. We conclude that EF ,F cannot be maximum preserving if both
B1 and B2 are non-empty. In other words, at least one of F or F must be 0–1-valued. 
3.2. Sufficient Conditions for Maxitivity. We derive sufficient conditions for the two different cases
described by Proposition 6, starting with 0–1-valued F .
3.2.1. Maxitivity for Zero-One Valued Lower Cumulative Distribution Functions. We first provide a sim-
ple expression for the natural extension of such p-boxes over events.
Proposition 7. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box with 0–1-valued F, and let B tx PΩ : Fpxq  0u. Then, for any
AΩ,
EF ,FpAq 
#
infxPΩ : AXB¨x Fpxq if y  AXBc for at least one y P Bc,
1 otherwise.
(8)
min
yPBc
inf
xPΩ : AXr0Ω,ys¨x
Fpxq. (9)
In the above, A¨ x means z¨ x for all z PA, and similarly y A means y  z for all z PA. For example,
it holds that H¨ x and y H for all x and y.
Proof. We deduce from Eq. (5) and from the conjugacy between EF ,F and EF ,F that for any AΩ,
EF ,FpAq  sup
px0,x1sYYpx2n,x2n 1sA
n¸
k0
maxt0,Fpx2k 1qFpx2kqu.
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All the terms in this sum are zero except possibly for one (if it exists) where x2k P B,x2k 1 P Bc, where
we get 1Fpx2kq. Aside, as subsets of Ω, note that both B and Bc are non-empty: 0Ω P B and 1Ω P Bc.
Consequently,
EF ,FpAq  1 inf
x,y : xPB,yPBc,px,ysA
Fpxq;
and therefore
EF ,FpAq  inf
x,y : xPB,yPBc,px,ysAc
Fpxq
 inf
x,y : xPB,yPBc,Ar0Ω,xsYpy,1Ωs
Fpxq
where it is understood that the infimum evaluates to 1 whenever there are no x P B and y P Bc such that
A r0Ω,xsY py,1Ωs.
Now, for any x P B and y P Bc, it holds that A r0Ω,xsY py,1Ωs if and only if
AXB pr0Ω,xsY py,1ΩsqXB r0Ω,xs and
AXBc  pr0Ω,xsY py,1ΩsqXBc  py,1Ωs,
that is, if and only if
AXB¨ x and y  AXBc.
Hence, if there is an y P Bc such that y  AXBc, then:
(i) either there is no x P B such that AXB¨ x, whence
EF,FpAq  1 inf
xPΩ : AXB¨x
Fpxq,
taking into account that for any x P Ω such that AXB¨ x it must be that x P Bc, whence Fpxq 
Fpxq  1;
(ii) or there is some x P B such that AXB¨ x, in which case
EF,FpAq  inf
xPB : AXB¨x
Fpxq  inf
xPΩ : AXB¨x
Fpxq,
where the second equality follows from the monotonicity of F .
This establishes Eq. (8).
We now turn to proving Eq. (9). In case y  AXBc for at least one y P Bc, it follows that
EF,FpAq  inf
xPΩ : AXB¨x
Fpxq
But in this case, AXB AXr0Ω,y1s for any y1 P Bc such that y1 ¨ y, because
AXr0,y1s  AXr0Ω,y1sX pBYBcq  pAXBXr0Ω,y1sqY pAXBcXr0Ω,y1sq  AXB
as BXr0Ω,y1s  B and AXBcXr0Ω,y1s  H because y1 ¨ y and y  AXBc. So, by the monotonicity of
F , Eq. (9) follows.
In case y⊀ AXBc for all y P Bc, it follows that
EF ,FpAq  1 Fpxq
for all x in Bc—indeed, because AXr0,ysXBc H for every y P Bc, it holds that AXr0,ys¨ x implies
x P Bc, and hence Fpxq  1. Again, Eq. (9) follows. 
A few common important special cases are summarized in the following corollary:
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Corollary 8. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box with 0–1-valued F, and let B tx PΩ : Fpxq  0u. If Ω{  is order
complete, then, for any AΩ,
EF ,FpAq minyPBc FpsupAXr0Ω,ysq. (10)
If, in addition, Bc has a minimum, then
EF ,FpAq  FpsupAXr0Ω,minB
c
sq. (11)
If, in addition, Bc  r1Ωs (this occurs exactly when F is vacuous, i.e. F  I
r1Ωs), then
EF,FpAq  FpsupAq. (12)
Note that Eq. (12) is essentially due to [6, paragraph preceeding Theorem 11]—they work with chains
and multivalued mappings, whereas we work with total preorders. We are now ready to show that the
considered p-boxes are maxitive measures.
Proposition 9. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box where F is 0–1-valued. Then EF ,F is maximum-preserving.
Proof. Consider a finite collection A of subsets of Ω. If there are A P A such that, for all y P Bc,
y⊀ AXBc, then EF,FpAq  1 EF ,FpYAPA Aq by Eq. (8), establishing the desired result for this case.
So, from now on, we may assume that, for every A PA , there is a yA P Bc such that yA   AXBc. With
yminAPA yA P Bc, it holds that y YAPA AXBc, and so, by Eq. (8),
EF ,FpAq  inf
xPΩ : AXB¨x
Fpxq for every A PA , and
EF,FpYAPA Aq  inf
xPΩ : YAPA AXB¨x
Fpxq.
Now, because A is finite, there is an A1 PA such that
tx PΩ : A1XB¨ xu  XAPA tx PΩ : AXB¨ xu
and becauseYAPA AXB¨ x if and only if AXB¨ x for all A PA ,
 tx PΩ : YAPA AXB¨ xu.
Consequently,
max
APA
EF ,FpAq maxAPA
inf
xPΩ : AXB¨x
Fpxq
¥ inf
xPΩ : A1XB¨x
Fpxq  inf
xPΩ : YAPA AXB¨x
Fpxq  EF ,FpYAPA Aq.
The converse inequality follows from the coherence of EF ,F . Concluding,
max
APA
EF ,FpAq  EF ,F pYAPA Aq
for any finite collection A of subsets of Ω. 
3.2.2. Maxitivity for Zero-One Valued Upper Cumulative Distribution Functions. Let us now consider
the case of 0–1-valued F .
Proposition 10. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box with 0–1-valued F, and let C  tx P Ω : Fpxq  0u. Then, for
any AΩ,
EF ,FpAq 
#
1 supyPΩ : y AXCc Fpyq if AXC¨ x for at least one x PC,
1 otherwise.
(13)
 1max
xPC
sup
yPΩ : y AXpx,1Ωs
Fpyq. (14)
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Proof. We deduce from Eq. (5) and from the conjugacy between EF ,F and EF,F that for any AΩ,
EF,FpAq  sup
px0,x1sYYpx2n,x2n 1sA
n¸
k0
maxt0,Fpx2k 1qFpx2kqu.
All the terms in this sum are zero except possibly for one (if it exists) where x2k PC,x2k 1 PCc, where
we get Fpx2k 1q. Aside, as subsets of Ω, note that both C and Cc are non-empty: 0Ω PC and 1Ω PCc.
Consequently,
EF ,FpAq  sup
x,y : xPC,yPCc,px,ysA
Fpyq;
and therefore
EF ,FpAq  1 sup
x,y : xPC,yPCc ,px,ysAc
Fpyq
 1 sup
x,y : xPC,yPCc ,Ar0Ω,xsYpy,1Ωs
Fpyq
where it is understood that the supremum evaluates to 0 whenever there are no x PC and y PCc such that
A r0Ω,xsY py,1Ωs.
Now, for any x PC and y PCc, it holds that A r0Ω,xsY py,1Ωs if and only if
AXC pr0Ω,xsY py,1ΩsqXC r0Ω,xs and
AXCc  pr0Ω,xsY py,1ΩsqXCc  py,1Ωs,
that is, if and only if
AXC¨ x and y  AXCc.
Hence, if there is an x PC such that AXC¨ x, then:
(i) either there is no y PCc such that y  AXCc, whence
EF ,FpAq  1 1 sup
yPΩ : y AXCc
Fpyq,
taking into account that for any y P Ω such that y   AXCc it must be that y PC, whence Fpyq 
Fpyq  0;
(ii) or there is some y PCc such that y  AXCc, in which case
EF ,FpAq  1 sup
yPCc : y AXCc
Fpyq  1 sup
yPΩ : y AXCc
Fpyq,
where the second equality follows from the monotonicity of F .
This establishes Eq. (13).
We now turn to proving Eq. (14). In case AXC¨ x for at least one x PC, it follows that
EF ,FpAq  1 sup
yPΩ : y AXCc
Fpyq.
But in this case, AXCc  AXpx1,1Ωs for any x1 PC such that x1 © x, because
AXpx1,1Ωs  AXpx1,1ΩsX pCYCcq  pAXCXpx1,1ΩsqY pAXCcXpx1,1Ωsq  AXCc
as CcXpx1,1Ωs Cc and AXCXpx1,1Ωs  H by assumption. So, by the monotonicity of F , Eq. (14)
follows.
In case AXC x for all x PC, it follows that
EF,FpAq  1 1Fpyq
for all y in C—indeed, because AXpx,1ΩsXC H for every x PC, it holds that y  AXpx,1Ωs implies
y PC, and hence Fpyq  0. Again, Eq. (14) follows. 
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A few common important special cases are summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 11. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box with 0–1-valued F, and let C  tx P Ω : Fpxq  0u. If Ω{  is
order complete, and C has a maximum, then, for any AΩ,
EF,FpAq 
#
1FpinfAXCcq if AXCc has no minimum
1FppminAXCcqq if AXCc has a minimum. (15)
If, in addition, C  t0Ωu (this occurs exactly when F is vacuous, i.e. F  1), then
EF ,FpAq 
#
1FpinfAq if A has no minimum
1FpminAq if A has a minimum. (16)
Proof. Use Proposition 10, and note that pmaxC,1Ωs Cc. 
Using Eq. (13), we can also show that EF ,F is maximum-preserving when F is 0–1-valued:
Proposition 12. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box where F is 0–1-valued. Then EF,F is maximum-preserving.
Proof. Consider a finite collection A of subsets of Ω. If there are A PA such that, for all x PC, AXC x,
then EF ,FpAq  1 EF ,FpYAPA Aq by Eq. (13), establishing the desired result for this case.
So, from now on, we may assume that, for every A PA , there is an xA PC such that AXC ¨ xA. With
xmaxAPA xA PC, it holds that YAPA AXC¨ x, and so, by Eq. (13),
EF ,FpAq  1 sup
yPΩ : y AXCc
Fpyq for every A PA , and
EF ,FpYAPA Aq  1 sup
yPΩ : y YAPA AXCc
Fpyq.
Now, because A is finite, there is an A1 PA such that
ty PΩ : y  A1XCcu  XAPA ty PΩ : y  AXCcu
and because y YAPA AXCc if and only if y  AXCc for all A PA ,
 ty PΩ : y YAPA AXCcu.
Consequently,
max
APA
EF ,FpAq maxAPA

1 sup
yPΩ : y AXCc
Fpyq

¥ 1 sup
yPΩ : y A1XCc
Fpyq  1 sup
yPΩ : y YAPA AXCc
Fpyq  EF ,FpYAPA Aq.
The converse inequality follows from the coherence of EF ,F . Concluding,
max
APA
EF ,FpAq  EF ,F pYAPA Aq
for any finite collection A of subsets of Ω. 
3.3. Summary of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. Putting Propositions 6, 9 and 12 together, we
get the following conditions.
Corollary 13. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box. Then, pF ,Fq is maximum-preserving if and only if
F is 0–1-valued
or
F is 0–1-valued.
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These simple conditions characterise maximum-preserving p-boxes and bring us closer to p-boxes that
are possibility measures, and that we will now study.
4. P-BOXES AS POSSIBILITY MEASURES.
In this section, we identify when p-boxes coincide exactly with a possibility measure. By Corollary 13,
when Ω{  is finite, pF ,Fq is a possibility measure if and only if either F or F is 0–1-valued. More
generally, when Ω{  is not finite, we will rely on the following trivial, yet important, lemma:
Lemma 14. For a p-box pF ,Fq there is a possibility measure Π such that EF,F Π if and only if
EF ,FpAq  sup
xPA
EF ,Fptxuq for all AΩ (17)
and in such a case, the possibility distribution pi associated with Π is pipxq  EF ,Fptxuq.
Proof. “if”. If EF,FpAq  supxPA EF ,Fptxuq for all AΩ, then EF ,F  EΠ with the suggested choice of
pi , because, for all AΩ,
EF ,FpAq  1EF ,FpA
c
q  1 sup
xPAc
EF ,Fptxuq  1 sup
xPAc
pipxq  1ΠpAcq  EΠpAq.
“only if”. If EF,F  EΠ, then, for all AΩ,
EF ,FpAq ΠpAq  sup
xPA
pipxq  sup
xPA
Πptxuq  sup
xPA
EF,Fptxuq.

We will say that a p-box pF ,Fq is a possibility measure whenever Eq. (17) is satisfied.
Note that, due to Proposition 6, for a p-box to be a possibility measure, at least one of F or F must be
0–1-valued. Next, we give a characterisation of p-boxes inducing a possibility measure in each of these
two cases.
4.1. P-Boxes with Zero-One-Valued Lower Cumulative Distribution Functions. As mentioned, by
Corollary 13, a p-box with 0–1-valued F is maxitive, and its upper natural extension is given by Proposi-
tion 7. Whence, we can easily determine when such p-box is a possibility measure:
Proposition 15. Assume that Ω{  is order complete. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box with 0–1-valued F, and let
B tx PΩ : Fpxq  0u. Then, pF ,Fq is a possibility measure if and only if
(i) Fpxq  Fpxq for all x PΩ that have no immediate predecessor, and
(ii) Bc has a minimum,
and in such a case,
EF ,FpAq  sup
xPAXr0Ω,minBcs
Fpxq (18)
Note that, in case 1Ω is a minimum of Bc, condition (i) is essentially due to [6, Observation 9]. Also
note that, for EF,F to be a possibility measure, both conditions are still necessary even when Ω{  is not
order complete: the proof in this direction does not require order completeness.
As a special case, we mention that EF,F is a possibility measure with possibility distribution
pipxq 
#
Fpxq if x¨minBc
0 otherwise.
whenever Ω{  is finite.
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Proof. “only if”. Assume that pF ,Fq is a possibility measure. For every x P Ω that has no immediate
predecessor,
Fpxq  sup
x1 x
Fpx1q
and because EF ,Fptx1uq  Fpx1qFpx1q (see Eq. (7)),
¥ sup
x1 x
EF ,Fptx
1
uq
and because pF ,Fq is a possibility measure, by Lemma 14,
 EF,Fpr0Ω,xqq  Fpxq
using that x has no immediate predecessor and Eqs. (6). The converse inequality follows from the non-
decreasingness of F .
Next, assume that, ex absurdo, Bc  tx PΩ : Fpxq  1u has no minimum. This simply means that for
every x P Bc there is an x1 P Bc such that x1   x. So, in particular, Fpxq  Fpxq  1 for all x in Bc, and
hence,
EF,FpB
c
q  sup
xPBc
EF ,Fptxuq  sup
xPBc
pFpxqFpxqq  0.
Yet, also,
EF ,FpB
c
q  1
by Eq. (8). We arrived at a contradiction.
Finally, we show that Eq. (18) holds. By Eq. (9),
EF ,FpAq minyPBc infxPΩ : AXr0Ω,ys¨x
Fpxq  inf
xPΩ : AXr0Ω,minBcs¨x
Fpxq  EF ,FpA
1
q,
with A1 : AXr0Ω,minBcs. Since EF,F is a possibility measure, we conclude that
EF ,FpAq  EF ,FpA
1
q  sup
xPA1
EF ,Fptxuq  sup
xPA1
Fpxq,
because EF ,Fptxuq  Fpxq Fpxq  Fpxq, since Fpxq  0 for all x P r0,minBcs. Hence, Eq. (18)
holds.
“if”. The claim is established if we can show that Eq. (18) holds, because then
EF,FpAq  sup
xPAXr0Ω,minBcs
Fpxq  sup
xPAXr0Ω,minBcs
EF,Fptxuq¨ sup
xPA
EF ,Fptxuq,
and the converse inequality follows from the monotonicity of EF ,F .
Consider any event A  Ω, and let y be a supremum of A1  AXr0Ω,minBcs (which exists because
Ω{  is order complete), so EF ,FpAq  Fpyq by Eq. (11). If y has an immediate predecessor, then A1 has
a maximum (as we will show next), and
EF ,FpAq  Fpyq  FpmaxA
1
q max
xPA1
Fpxq  sup
xPA1
Fpxq.
If y has no immediate predecessor, then either A1 has a maximum, and the above argument can be recycled,
or A1 has no maximum, in which case
EF,FpAq  Fpyq  Fpyq  sup
xPA1
Fpxq.
The last equality holds because
Fpyq  sup
x supA1
Fpxq
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and, A1 has no maximum, so for every x  supA1, there is an x1 P A1 such that x  x1   supA1, whence
 sup
x1PA1
Fpx1q.
We are left to prove A1 has a maximum whenever y has an immediate predecessor. Suppose that A1 has
no maximum. Then it must hold that
x  y for all x P A1
since otherwise x y for some x P A1, whereby x would be a maximum of A1.
But, since y has an immediate predecessor y, the above equation implies that
x¨ y for all x P A1.
Hence, y is an upper bound for A1, yet y  y: this implies that y is not a minimal upper bound for A1,
or in other words, that y is not a supremum of A1: we arrived at a contradiction. We conclude that A1 must
have a maximum. 
4.2. P-Boxes with Zero-One-Valued Upper Cumulative Distribution Functions. Similarly, we can
also determine when a p-box with 0–1-valued F is a possibility measure:
Proposition 16. Assume that Ω{  is order complete. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box with 0–1-valued F, and let
C  tx PΩ : Fpxq  0u. Then, pF ,Fq is a possibility measure if and only if
(i) Fpxq  Fpx q for all x PΩ that have no immediate successor, and
(ii) C has a maximum,
and in such a case,
EF,FpAq  1 infyPAXCc Fpyq. (19)
Again, for EF,F to be a possibility measure, both conditions are still necessary even when Ω{  is not
order complete: the proof in this direction does not require order completeness.
As a special case, we mention that EF,F is a possibility measure with possibility distribution
pipxq 
#
1Fpxq if x PCc
0 otherwise,
whenever Ω{  is finite.
Proof. “only if”. Assume that pF,Fq is a possibility measure. For every x P Ω that has no immediate
successor,
Fpx q  inf
x1¡x
Fpx1q  inf
x1¡x
Fpx1q
where the latter equality holds because for every x1 ¡ x there is an x2 such that x1 ¡ x2 ¡ x; otherwise, x
would have an immediate successor. Now, because EF ,Fptx1uq  Fpx1qFpx1q (see Eq. (7)), Fpx1q¤
1EF ,Fptx1uq, whence
¤ inf
x1¡x
p1EF ,Fptx
1
uqq  1 sup
x1¡x
EF,Fptx
1
uq
and because pF ,Fq is a possibility measure, by Lemma 14,
 1EF ,Fppx,1Ωsq  Fpxq,
where last equality follows from Eq. (2). The converse inequality follows from the non-decreasingness
of F .
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Next, assume that, ex absurdo, C  tx P Ω : Fpxq  0u has no maximum. Since Fpxq  Fpxq  0
for all x in C,
EF ,FpCq  sup
xPC
EF ,Fptxuq  sup
xPC
pFpxqFpxqq  0.
Yet, also,
EF ,FpCq  1
by Eq. (13)—indeed, the second case applies because there is no x P C such that C ¨ x, as C has no
maximum. We arrived at a contradiction.
Finally, we show that Eq. (19) holds. By Eq. (14),
EF ,FpAq  1max
xPC
sup
yPΩ : y AXpx,1Ωs
Fpyq  1 sup
yPΩ : y AXpmaxC,1Ωs
Fpyq  EF ,FpA
1
q,
with A1 : AXpmaxC,1Ωs  AXCc. Since EF ,F is a possibility measure, we conclude that
EF ,FpAq  EF ,FpA
1
q  sup
yPA1
EF,Fptyuq  sup
yPA1
p1Fpyqq  1 inf
yPA1
Fpyq,
because EF ,Fptyuq  FpyqFpyq  1Fpyq, since Fpyq  1 for all y PCc. Hence, Eq. (19) holds.
“if”. The claim is established if we can show that Eq. (19) holds, because then
EF,FpAq  1 infyPAXCc Fpyq  supyPAXCc
p1Fpyqq ¤ sup
yPA
EF,Fptyuq,
and the converse inequality follows from the monotonicity of EF ,F .
Consider any event A  Ω, and let x be an infimum of A1  AXCc (which exists because Ω{  is
order complete). If x has an immediate successor, then A1 has a minimum (as we will show next), and by
Eq. (15),
EF ,FpAq  1FpminA
1
q  1min
yPA1
Fpyq  1 inf
yPA1
Fpyq.
If x has no immediate successor, then either A1 has a minimum, and the above argument can be recycled,
or A1 has no minimum, in which case Eq. (15) implies that
EF,FpAq  1Fpxq  1Fpx q  1 infyPA1
Fpyq.
Here the second equality follows from assumption (i) and the last equality holds because
Fpx q  inf
y¡infA1
Fpyq
and, A1 has no minimum, so for every y¡ infA1, there is a y1 PΩ such that y¡ y1 ¡ infA1, whence
 inf
y¡infA1
sup
y¡y1¡infA
Fpy1q  inf
y¡infA1
Fpyq
and, again, A1 has no minimum, so for every y¡ infA1, there is a y2 P A1 such that y¡ y2 ¡ infA1, whence
 inf
y2PA1
Fpy2q.
We are left to prove A1 has a minimum whenever x has an immediate successor. Suppose that A1 has
no minimum. Then it must hold that
y¡ x for all y P A1
since otherwise y x for some y P A1, whereby y would be a minimum of A1.
But, since x has an immediate successor x , the above equation implies that
y© x  for all y P A1.
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Hence, x  is a lower bound for A1, yet x  ¡ x: this implies that x is not a maximal lower bound for A1,
or in other words, that x is not an infimum of A1: we arrived at a contradiction. We conclude that A1 must
have a minimum. 
4.3. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. Merging Corollary 13 with Propositions 15 and 16 we obtain
the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a p-box to be a possibility measure:
Corollary 17. Assume that Ω{ is order complete and let pF ,Fq be a p-box. Then pF ,Fq is a possibility
measure if and only if either
(L1) F is 0–1-valued,
(L2) Fpxq  Fpxq for all x PΩ that have no immediate predecessor, and
(L3) tx PΩ : Fpxq  1u has a minimum,
or
(U1) F is 0–1-valued,
(U2) Fpxq  Fpx q for all x PΩ that have no immediate successor, and
(U3) tx PΩ : Fpxq  0u has a maximum.
This result settles the cases where p-boxes reduce to possibility measures. We can now go the other
way around, and characterise those cases where possibility measures are p-boxes. Similarly to what
happens in the finite setting, we will see that almost all possibility measures can be represented by a
p-box.
5. FROM POSSIBILITY MEASURES TO P-BOXES
In this section, we discuss and extend some previous results linking possibility distribution to p-boxes.
We show that possibility measures correspond to specific kinds of p-boxes, and that some p-boxes corre-
spond to the conjunction of two possibility distribution.
5.1. Possibility Measures as Specific P-boxes. [1] already discuss the link between possibility measures
and p-boxes defined on the real line with the usual ordering, and they show that any possibility measure
can be approximated by a p-box, however at the expense of losing some information. We substantially
strengthen their result, and even reverse it: we prove that any possibility measure with compact range
can be exactly represented by a p-box with vacuous lower cumulative distribution function, that is, F 
I
r1Ωs . In other words, generally speaking, possibility measures are a special case of p-boxes on totally
preordered spaces.
Theorem 18. For every possibility measure Π on Ω with possibility distribution pi such that pipΩq 
tpipxq : x P Ωu is compact, there is a preorder ¨ on Ω and an upper cumulative distribution function F
such that the p-box pF  I
r1Ωs ,Fq is a possibility measure with possibility distribution pi , that is, such
that for all events A:
EF ,FpAq  sup
xPA
pipxq.
In fact, one may take the preorder ¨ to be the one induced by pi (so x ¨ y whenever pipxq ¤ pipyq) and
F  pi .
Proof. Let ¨ be the preorder induced by pi . Order completeness of Ω{  is satisfied because pipΩq is
compact with respect to the usual topology on R. Indeed, for any AΩ, the supremum and infimum of
pi over A belong to pipΩq by its compactness, whence pi1pinfxPA pipxqq consists of the infima of A, and
pi1psupxPA pipxqq consists of its suprema.
Consider the p-box pI
r1Ωs ,piq. Then, for any AΩ, we deduce from Eq. (12) that
EF,FpAq  FpsupAq  pipsupAq  sup
xPA
pipxq
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because x¨ y for all x P A if and only if pipxq ¤ pipyq for all x PA, by definition of¨, and hence, a minimal
upper bound, or supremum, y for A must be one for which pipyq  supxPA pipxq (and, again, such y exists
because pipΩq is compact). 
The representing p-box is not necessarily unique:
Example 19. Let Ω  tx1,x2u and let Π be the possibility measure determined by the possibility distri-
bution
pipx1q  0.5 pipx2q  1.
As proven in Theorem 18, this possibility measure can be obtained if we consider the order x1   x2 and
the p-box pF1,F1q given by
F1px1q  0 F1px2q  1
F1px1q  0.5 F1px2q  1.
However, we also obtain it if we consider the order x2   x1 and the p-box pF2,F2q given by
F2px1q  1 F2px2q  0.5
F2px1q  1 F2px2q  1.
The p-box pF2,F2q induces a possibility measure from Corollary 13, also taking into account that Ω is
finite. Moreover, by Eq. (7),
EF2,F2px2q  Fpx2qFpx2q  1
EF2,F2px1q  Fpx1qFpx1q  0.5
as with the given ordering, x2 0Ω and x1 x2. As a consequence, EF2,F2 is a possibility measure
associated to the possibility distribution pi .
There are possibility measures which cannot be represented as p-boxes when pipΩq is not compact:
Example 20. Let Ωr0,1s, and consider the possibility distribution given by pipxq p1 2xq{8 if x  0.5,
pip0.5q  0.4 and pipxq  x if x ¡ 0.5; note that pipΩq  r0.125,0.25qY t0.4uY p0.5,1s is not compact.
The ordering induced by pi is the usual ordering on r0,1s. Let Π be the possibility measure induced by
pi . We show that there is no p-box pF ,Fq on pr0,1s,¨q, regardless of the ordering ¨ on r0,1s, such that
EF,F Π.
By Corollary 13, if EF,F  Π, then at least one of F or F is 0-1–valued. Assume first that F is 0-
1–valued. By Eq. (7), EF,Fptxuq  FpxqFpxq  pipxq. Because pipxq ¡ 0 for all x, it must be that
Fpxq  0 for all x, so F  pi . Because F is non-decreasing, x ¨ y if and only if Fpxq ¤ Fpyq; in other
words, ¨ can only be the usual ordering on r0,1s for pF ,Fq to be a p-box. Hence, F  I
t1u.
Now, with A r0,0.5q, we deduce from Proposition 7 that
EF,FpAq  infA¨xFpxq  0.4¡ 0.25 supxPA
pipxq ΠpAq,
where the second equality follows because Bc  t1u. Hence, EF ,F does not coincide with Π.
Similarly, if F would be 0–1-valued, then we deduce from Eq. (7) that Fpxq  1 for every x, again
because pipxq ¡ 0 for all x. Therefore, Fpxq  1pipxq for all x. But, because F is non-decreasing, ¨
can only be the inverse of the usual ordering on r0,1s for pF ,Fq to be a p-box.
This deserves some explanation. We wish to show that Fpxq   Fpyq implies x   y. Assume ex
absurdo that x¡ y. But, then,
Fpxq  sup
z x
Fpzq ¥ sup
z y
Fpzq  Fpyq,
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a contradiction. It also cannot hold that x y, because in that case z  x if and only if z  y, and whence it
would have to hold that Fpxq Fpyq. Concluding, it must hold that x  y whenever Fpxq  Fpyq,
or in other words, whenever x ¡ y. So, ¨ can only be the inverse of the usual ordering on r0,1s and, in
particular, r0,1s{  is order complete.
Now, for pF ,Fq to induce the possibility measure Π, we know from Corollary 17 that Fpxq  Fpx q
for every x that has no immediate successor in with respect to ¨, that is, for every x  0, or equivalently,
for every x¡ 0. Whence,
Fpxq  Fpx q  inf
y¡x
Fpyq  inf
y¡x
Fpyq  1 sup
y¡x
pipyq  1 sup
y x
pipyq
for all x¡ 0. This leads to a contradiction: by the definition of pi , we have on the one hand,
Fp0.5q  sup
x 0.5
Fpxq  sup
x¡0.5
Fpxq  sup
x¡0.5
p1 sup
y x
pipyqq  0.5
and on the other hand,
Fp0.5q 1pip0.5q  0.6.
Concluding, EF,F coincides with Π in neither case.
Another way of relating possibility measures and p-boxes goes via random sets (see for instance [19]
and [9]). Possibility measures on ordered spaces can also be obtained via upper probabilities of random
sets (see for instance [6, Sections 7.5–7.7] and [21]).
5.2. P-boxes as Conjunction of Possibility Measures. In [9], where p-boxes are studied on finite
spaces, it is shown that a p-box can be interpreted as the conjunction of two possibility measures, in
the sense that M pPF ,Fq is the intersection of two sets of additive probabilities induced by two possibility
measures. The next proposition extends this result to arbitrary totally preordered spaces.
Proposition 21. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box such that pF1  F,F1  IΩq and pF2  Ir1Ωs ,F2  Fq are pos-
sibility measures. Then, pF ,Fq is the intersection of two possibility measures defined by the distributions
pi1pxq  1Fpxq pi2pxq  Fpxq
in the sense that M pPF ,Fq M pΠ1qXM pΠ2q.
Proof. Using Propositions 15 and 16, and the fact that, by construction, r0Ω,minBcs Cc Ω, it follows
readily that pi1 and pi2 are the possibility distributions corresponding to the p-boxes pF1,F1q and pF2,F2q.
Thus, by assumption, EF1,F1 Π1 and EF2,F2 Π2. Because natural extensions of two coherent lower
previsions can only coincide when their credal sets are the same [36, §3.6.1], it follows that
M pPF1,F1q M pΠ1q M pPF2,F2q M pΠ2q
We are left to prove that
M pPF,Fq M pPF1,F1qXM pPF2,F2q
but this follows almost trivially after writing down the constraints for each p-box. 
This suggests a simple way (already mentioned in [9]) to conservatively approximate EF ,F by using
the two possibility distributions:
maxtEpiF pAq,EpiF pAqu ¤ EF ,FpAq ¤ EF ,FpAq ¤mintEpiF pAq,EpiF pAqu.
This approximation is computationally attractive, as it allows us to use the supremum preserving prop-
erties of possibility measures. However, as next example shows, the approximation will usually be very
conservative, and hence not likely to be helpful.
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FIGURE 3. A 0–1-valued p-box.
Example 22. Consider x   y P Ω. The distance between EF ,F and its approximation mintEpiF ,EpiF u on
the interval px,ys is given by
mintEpiF ppx,ysq,EpiF ppx,ysquEppx,ysq
mintFpyq,1FpxqupFpyqFpxqq
mintFpxq,1Fpyqu.
Therefore, the approximation will be close to the exact value on this set only when either Fpxq is close to
zero or Fpyq is close to one.
6. NATURAL EXTENSION OF 0–1-VALUED P-BOXES
From Proposition 7, we can derive an expression for the natural extension of a 0–1-valued p-box (see
Figure 3):
Proposition 23. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box where F  ICc ,F  IBc for some C BΩ. Then for any AΩ,
EF ,FpAq 
$
'
&
'
%
0 if there are x PC and y P Bc such that
AXC¨ x and AXBXCc H and y  AXBc
1 otherwise.
(20)
Proof. From Proposition 7, the natural extension of pF ,Fq is given by
EF,FpAq 
#
infxPΩ : AXB¨x Fpxq if y  AXBc for at least one y P Bc,
1 otherwise.
Now, if F  ICc , the infimum in the first equation is equal to 0 if and only if there is some x PC such that
AXB¨ x, and equal to 1 otherwise. Finally, note that AXB¨ x if and only if
AXBXC r0Ω,xsXC and
AXBXCc  r0Ω,xsXCc
and observe that BXC  C, r0Ω,xsXC  r0Ω,xs, and r0Ω,xsXCc H, to arrive at the conditions in
Eq. (20). 
Moreover, Propositions 15 and 16 allow us to determine when this p-box is a possibility measure:
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Proposition 24. Assume that Ω{  is order complete. Let pF ,Fq be a p-box where F  ICc ,F  IBc for
some C  B  Ω. Then pF ,Fq is a possibility measure if and only if C has a maximum and Bc has a
minimum. In such a case,
EF ,FpAq 
#
1 if AXpmaxC,minBcs H
0 otherwise
or, in other words, in such a case, EF ,F is a possibility measure with possibility distribution
pipxq 
#
1 if x P pmaxC,minBcs
0 otherwise.
Proof. “only if”. Immediate by Propositions 15 and 16.
“if”. By Proposition 15, pF ,Fq is a possibility measure if and only if Bc has a minimum and Fpxq 
Fpxq for every x with no immediate predecessor. The latter condition holds for every x P C, and for
every x PCc with a predecessor in Cc. Whence, we only need to check whether Cc has a minimum—if
not, then every x PCc has a predecessor in Cc—and if so, that this minimum has an immediate predecessor
(because obviously 1 FpminCq  FpminCq  0 cannot hold).
Indeed, because C has a maximum, Cc  pmaxC,1Ωs. So, either Cc has a minimum, in which case
maxC must be the immediate predecessor of this minimum, or Cc has no minimum.
The expression for EF ,FpAq follows from Eq. (20). In that equality, without loss of generality, we can
take xmaxC and yminBc, and AXC¨maxC is obviously always satisfied, so
EF ,FpAq 
#
0 if AXBXCc H and minBc   AXBc
1 otherwise
So, to establish the desired equality, it suffices to show that AXBXCc H and minBc   AXBc if and
only if AXpmaxC,minBcs H.
Indeed, minBc   AXBc precisely when minBc R A. Moreover,
BXCc  r0Ω,minBcqXpmaxC,1Ωs  pmaxC,minBcq.
So, the desired equivalence is established. 
In particular, we can characterise under which conditions a precise p-box, i.e., one where F  F :
F , induces a possibility measure. The natural extension of precise p-boxes on the unit interval was
considered in [24, Section 3.1]. From Proposition 6, the natural extension of F can only be a possibility
measure when F is 0–1-valued. If we apply Proposition 23 with BC we obtain the following:
Corollary 25. Let pF,Fq be a precise p-box where F F is 0–1-valued, and let B tx PΩ : Fpxq  0u.
Then, for every subset A of Ω,
EF ,FpAq 
#
0 if there are x P B,y P Bc such that AXB¨ x and y  AXBc
1 otherwise.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 23. 
Moreover, Proposition 24 allows us to determine when this p-box is a possibility measure:
Corollary 26. Assume that Ω{  is order complete. Let pF ,Fq be a precise p-box where F  F is 0–
1-valued, and let B  tx P Ω : Fpxq  0u. Then, pF,Fq is a possibility measure if and only if B has a
maximum and Bc has a minimum. In that case, for every AΩ,
EF ,FpAq 
#
0 if minBc R A
1 otherwise.
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Proof. Immediate by Proposition 24 and Corollary 25. 
As a consequence, we deduce that a precise 0–1-valued p-box on pΩ,¨q  pr0,1s,¤q never induces a
possibility measure—except when F  I
r0,1s. Indeed, if F  Ir0,1s, then BXr0,1s H, and the maximum
of B would need to have an immediate successor (the minimum of Bc), which cannot be for the usual
ordering¤.
When F  I
r0,1s, we obtain maxB  0 and minBc  0, whence applying Corollary 26 we deduce
that pF,Fq is a possibility measure, with possibility distribution
pipxq 
#
1 if x 0
0 otherwise.
To see why the possibility distribution
pipxq 
#
1 if x y
0 otherwise
for any y¡ 0 does not correspond to the precise p-box pF,Fq with F  I
ry,1s, first note that
Πpr0,yqq  sup
x y
pipxq  0.
But, for Π to be the p-box EF,F , we also require that
EF,Fpr0,yqq  FpyqFp0q  1
using Eq. (6), because y has no immediate predecessor. Whence, we arrive at a contradiction.
7. CONSTRUCTING MULTIVARIATE POSSIBILITY MEASURES FROM MARGINALS
In [34], multivariate p-boxes were constructed from marginals. We next apply this construction to-
gether with the p-box representation of possibility measures, given by Theorem 18, to build a joint possi-
bility measure from some given marginals. As particular cases, we consider the joint,
(i) either without any assumptions about dependence or independence between variables, that is, using
the Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds [17],
(ii) or assuming epistemic independence between all variables, which allows us to use the factorization
property [7].
Let us consider n variables X1, . . . , Xn assuming values in X1, . . . , Xn. Assume that for each variable
Xi we are given a possibility measure Πi with corresponding possibility distribution pii on Xi. We assume
that the range of all marginal possibility distributions is r0,1s; in particular, Theorem 18 applies, and each
marginal can be represented by a p-box on pXi,¨iq, with vacuous F i, and F i  pii. Remember that the
preorder¨i is the one induced by pii.
7.1. Multivariate Possibility Measures. The construction in [34] employs the following mapping Z,
which induces a preorder¨ on ΩX1 Xn:
Zpx1, . . . ,xnq 
n
max
i1
piipxiq. (21)
With this choice of Z, we can easily find the possibility measure which represents the joint as accurately
as possible, under any rule of combination of coherent lower probabilities:
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Lemma 27. Let d be any rule of combination of coherent upper probabilities, mapping the marginals
P1, . . . , Pn to a joint coherent upper probability
Än
i1 Pi on all events. If there is a continuous function u
for which
n
ä
i1
Pi

n
¹
i1
Ai

 upP1pA1q, . . . ,PnpAnqq
for all A1 X1, . . . , An Xn, then the possibility distribution pi defined by
pipxq  upZpxq, . . . ,Zpxqq
induces the least conservative upper cumulative distribution function on pΩ,¨q that dominates the com-
bination
Än
i1 Πi of Π1, . . . , Πn.
Proof. To apply [34, Lem. 22], we first must consider the upper cumulative distribution functions, which
in our case coincide with the possibility distributions, as functions on the unit interval z P r0,1s. For the
marginal possibility distribution pii, the preorder is the one induced by pii itself, so, as a function of z, pii
is simply the identity map:
piipzq  piippi
1
i pzqq  z.
Using [34, Lem. 22], the least conservative upper cumulative distribution function on the space pΩ,¨q
that dominates the combination
Än
i1 Πi is given by
Fpzq  uppi1pzq, . . . ,pinpzqq  upz, . . . ,zq z P r0,1s.
As a function of x PΩ, this means that
Fpxq  upZpxq, . . . ,Zpxqq
with the Z that induced¨, that is, the one defined in Eq. (21).
Now, by Proposition 15, such upper cumulative distribution function corresponds to a possibility mea-
sure with possibility distribution
pipxq  upZpxq, . . . ,Zpxqq
whenever Fpxq  Fpxq for all x PΩ that have no immediate predecessor, that is, whenever
Fpxq  sup
y : Zpyq Zpxq
Fpyq
for all x such that Zpxq ¡ 0. But this must hold, because (i) the range of Z is r0,1s, so Zpyq can get
arbitrarily close to Zpxq from below, and (ii) u is continuous, so Fpyq  upZpyq, . . . ,Zpyqq gets arbitrarily
close to Fpxq  upZpxq, . . . ,Zpxqq. 
7.2. Natural Extension: The Fre´chet Case. The natural extension ⊠ni1Pi of P1, . . . , Pn is the upper
envelope of all joint (finitely additive) probability measures whose marginal distributions are compatible
with the given marginal upper probabilities. So, the model is completely vacuous (that is, it makes no
assumptions) about the dependence structure, as it includes all possible forms of dependence. See [8,
p. 120, §3.1] for a rigorous definition. In this paper, we only need the following equality, which is one of
the Fre´chet bounds (see for instance [36, p. 122, §3.1.1]):
n
ò
i1
Pi

n
¹
i1
Ai


n
min
i1
PipAiq (22)
for all A1 X1, . . . , An Xn.
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Theorem 28. The possibility distribution
pipxq 
n
max
i1
piipxiq
induces the least conservative upper cumulative distribution function on pΩ,¨q that dominates the natu-
ral extension ⊠ni1Πi of Π1, . . . , Πn.
Proof. Immediate, by Lemma 27 and Eq. (22). 
7.3. Independent Natural Extension. In contrast, we can consider joint models which satisfy the prop-
erty of epistemic independence between the different X1, . . . , Xn. These have been studied in [23] in the
case of two marginal possibility measures. The most conservative of these models is called the indepen-
dent natural extension bni1Pi of P1, . . . , Pn. See [7] for a rigorous definition and properties, and [23] for
a study of joint possibility measures that satisfy epistemic independence in the case of two variables. In
this paper, we only need the following equality for the independent natural extension:
n
â
i1
Pi

n
¹
i1
Ai


n
¹
i1
PipAiq (23)
for all A1 X1, . . . , An Xn.
Theorem 29. The possibility distribution
pipxq 

n
max
i1
piipxiq

n
(24)
induces the least conservative upper cumulative distribution function on pΩ,¨q that dominates the inde-
pendent natural extension bni1Πi of Π1, . . . , Πn.
Proof. Immediate, by Lemma 27 and Eq. (23). 
Note, however, that there is no least conservative possibility measure that corresponds to the indepen-
dent natural extension of possibility measures [23, Sec. 6].
We do not consider the minimum rule and the product rule
n
min
i1
piipxiq and
n
¹
i1
piipxiq,
as their relation with the theory of coherent lower previsions is still unclear. However, we can compare
the above approximation with the following outer approximation given by [10, Proposition 1]:
pipxq 
n
min
i1
p1p1piipxiqqnq. (25)
The above equation is an outer approximation in case of random set independence, which is slightly
more conservative than the independent natural extension [5, Sec. 4], so in particular, it is also an outer
approximation of the independent natural extension. Essentially, each distribution pii is transformed into
1p1piiqn before applying the minimum rule. It can be expressed more simply as
1 nmax
i1
p1piipxiqqn.
If for instance pipxiq  1 for at least one i, then this formula provides a more informative (i.e., lower) upper
bound than Theorem 29. On the other hand, when all pipxiq are, say, less than 1{2, then Theorem 29 does
better.
Finally, note that neither Eq. (24) nor Eq. (25) are proper joints, in the sense that, in both cases, the
marginals of the joint are outer approximations of the original marginals, and will in general not coincide
with the original marginals.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
Both possibility measures and p-boxes can be seen as coherent upper probabilities. We used this
framework to study the relationship between possibility measures and p-boxes. Following [34], we al-
lowed p-boxes on arbitrary totally preordered spaces, whence including p-boxes on finite spaces, on real
intervals, and even multivariate ones.
We began by considering the more general case of maxitive measures, and proved that a necessary and
sufficient condition for a p-box to be maxitive is that at least one of the cumulative distribution functions
of the p-box must be 0–1 valued. Moreover, we determined the natural extension of a p-box in those cases
and gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the p-box to be supremum-preserving, i.e., a possibility
measure. As special cases, we also studied degenerate p-boxes, and precise 0–1 valued p-boxes.
Secondly, we showed that almost every possibility measure can be represented as a p-box. Hence, in
general, p-boxes are more expressive than possibility measures, while still keeping a relatively simple
representation and calculus [34], unlike many other models, such as for instance lower previsions and
credal sets, which typically require far more advanced techniques, such as linear programming.
Finally, we considered the multivariate case in more detail, by deriving a joint possibility measure
from given marginals using the p-box representation established in this paper and results from [34].
In conclusion, we established new connections between both models, strengthening known results
from literature, and allowing many results from possibility theory to be embedded into the theory of
p-boxes, and vice versa.
As future lines of research, we point out the generalisation of a number of properties of possibility
measures to p-boxes, such as the connection with fuzzy logic [39] or the representation by means of
graphical structures [3], and the study of the connection of p-boxes with other uncertainty models, such
as clouds and random sets.
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